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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between productivity and market competition. In 
comparison to the economies of other European countries, the Spanish economy has been growing, 
while productivity growth has stagnated. Here we provide empirical evidence about the 
relationship between productivity and market competition from Spanish manufacturing firms at 
firm level between 1994 and 2004. Correcting for selection bias, our study pays special attention to 
the patterns of productivity growth between openness and non-openness firms. When market 
competition increases the effect on firms operating in domestic markets is positive but when the 
level of competition is high incentives to invest in innovation and productivity gains disappear. The 
empirical relationship between competition and productivity is an inverted U-shape, where 
productivity growth is highest at intermediate levels of competition. The productivity growth of 
firms operating in international markets is higher than that of non-openness firms, but when market 
competition rises they moderate their productivity growth. Our empirical results suggest that the 
correct competition policy in the Spanish economy should remove the barriers to competition in 
internal markets in order to increase the incentives for manufacturing firms to invest in innovation 
and productivity growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The lower productivity performance of European countries relative to the US has been an important 
focus of interest in recent years. Many academics and policy makers believe that GDP per capita in 
the EU has stagnated at about 70 per cent of the US level because of a lack of the productivity 
growth due to the presence of competition barriers in the EU single market. Since the nineties the 
European Commission has promoted competition in both the product and factor markets –
competition policy- and investment in R&D and innovation –the Lisbon Agenda programme- 
through market liberalisations and public grants. Despite the importance of these topics, so far we 
have obtained little empirical evidence of the relationship between market competition, innovation 
and productivity performance in European countries at firm level.  
 
Understanding the effect of market competition on productivity is of particular interest to the 
Spanish economy. Since Spain joined the European Union in 1986, its economy has achieved 
higher average economic growth than the other European countries. However, Spanish productivity 
has also been in constant decline since the nineties, particularly in the manufacturing sectors. 
During the period 1990-1995 Total Factor Productivity recorded an average growth rate of -0.2% 
and during the period 2000-2005 zero per cent (OECD, 2006). Nevertheless many scholars are 
surprised by the rapid growth of the Spanish economy in recent years. In the words of Olivier 
Blanchard “How is Spain doing it? The ambiguous miracle: no labour productivity growth, 
negative TFP growth… But employment and investment growth” (Blanchard, 2005).1  What has 
happened in recent years? A simple answer is not easy. 
 
In order to answer the question, “Why has Spanish productivity slowed down in recent years?”, a 
range of factors such as firm size, number of large firms, private R&D investment and capital per 
worker ratio have been analysed by scholars. However, the role of market competition in 
promoting productivity gains has received little attention to date. For this reason this paper analyses 
the effect of market competition on productivity growth in Spanish manufacturing firms.  
 
                                                          
1 In recent years Spanish economic growth has been based on intense labour growth, a scarcity of capital per 
worker and human capital. This has caused a slow down in productivity growth. However, the 
macroeconomic results of recent years are satisfactory due to improvements to financial markets, salary 
moderation and demand growth. 
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In particular, our aim is to study the link between market competition, measured as one minus the 
value of sales less payroll and material costs divided by the value of sales (the inverse of the Lerner 
Index), and productivity growth, measured by Total Factor Productivity (henceforth TFP) in 
manufacturing Spanish firms during the period 1994-2004. In recent years, empirical literature has 
measured competition with a range of variables such as industry concentration, market share, price-
cost margin ratios and profits and has measured innovation in a number of ways, including TFP, 
patents, R&D investments, product or process innovation number (see a survey of this literature in 
Boone, 2000). Our database from the Spanish Business Register allows estimation of TFP and 
price-cost margin ratio proxies through the Lerner Index yearly at firm level.  
 
This paper deals with the literature on how competition affects innovation and productivity. In 
recent years a range of theoretical research has highlighted the relationship between competition 
and firms’ incentives to innovate and improve productivity gains (Vickers, 1995; Boone, 2001). 
There is a great deal of literature on the effect of competition on firms’ innovative activities, but 
relatively little on theoretical analysis and empirical econometric calibration. It has been stressed 
that competition acts as a driving force because it incentivizes efficiency and productivity in firms. 
Gerosky (1995), Nickell (1996), Blundell et al (1999) and Disney et al (2000), among others, 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between competition, innovation and productivity 
growth. However, recent empirical research finds that the relationship between competition and 
innovation or productivity describes an inverse U-shape. This means that the productivity rate is 
highest at intermediate levels of competition (Aghion et al, 2001; Aghion et al, 2002). Hence, 
empirical evidence reveals a trade-off between the displacement effect and the Schumpeterian 
effect, which depends on the intensity and characteristics of the market.  
 
It is a well-known fact that nowadays the engine of economic growth is a firm’s incentives for 
innovation and productivity growth. The critical driving force of economic growth is the intensity 
and the nature of market competition to provide an incentive for innovation and productivity 
growth at firm level. The Schumpeterian models and new growth theories emphasised the firms’ 
heterogeneity, imperfect competition and the central role of the innovation driving technological 
change and productivity growth. In this sense, to create new ideas and apply innovations firms 
must be able to charge prices greater than marginal cost. How Jones (1998) remarks the wedge 
between price and marginal cost provides the economic “fuel” for the engine of growth.  
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This argument is particularly important in economies like Spain, which has opened intensively to 
foreign markets in recent years in spite of being far from the world’s technological frontier. In fact, 
the main objective of competition policies is to improve firms’ incentives to increase innovation 
and productivity growth, and to bridge the transition to international competitiveness by first 
reducing protective trade barriers in local or regional markets such as the EU single market 
(Scherer, 2000). Barriers to innovation are particularly evident in economies such as Spain’s which 
in recent years has opened up to foreign markets in spite of being a long way from the world 
technological frontier.  
 
In Spain the increased availability of micro-level data in recent years has promoted research on the 
sources of a firm’s growth and productivity. Some works reveal a close relationship between 
innovative activities and productivity growth in manufacturing firms. For a sample of Spanish 
manufacturing firms Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004a) find that the innovation process at some 
point leads to extra productivity growth, which persists over time but decreases with the years. 
Other works have found a positive correlation between market dynamics–entry and exit of firms- 
and productivity growth in Spanish manufacturing (Callejón and Segarra, 1999,  Fariñas and 
Ruano, 2004); differences in productivity levels between exporting and non-exporting firms 
(Delgado et al, 2002), between importing and non-importing firms (Fariñas, 2006), between 
different sized firms (Castany et al, 2005), and between age firms (Huergo and Jaumandreu, 
2004b). Other works analyse the external determinants of the efficiency level in Spanish firms 
(Gumbau and Maudos, 2002). In conclusion, these studies highlight the heterogeneity levels of 
productivity in accordance with external factors, such as competition pressure, market turbulence 
and market structure, and internal firm factors, such as export and import propensity, size, age and 
location, among others. 
 
In addition, this research addresses four questions: (1) when market competition improves 
productivity gains in the Spanish manufacturing firms, (2) the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between market competition measured by the profitability index and productivity 
growth; (3) how the geographical dimension of the markets, distinguishing between foreign and 
domestic markets, determine different competitive environments which cause differences in 
productivity growth patterns, and (4) what effect individual firm characteristics, such as financial 
pressure, size, age or debt have on productivity growth.  
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The data is provided by the Business Register where Spanish firms present their accounts every 
year. We selected all manufacturing firms with more than 250 employees. We obtained a large 
unbalanced panel of 1,327 companies. The exhaustive panel data provides accurate analysis of the 
relationship between competitive pressure and productivity growth for two different samples of 
firms in relation to the geographical dimension of the markets. We have a first group with 816 
companies oriented towards foreign markets (firms that usually import and export), and a second 
group with 511 companies with fewer links to international markets (firms without import and 
export activities, only import or only export). Our research aims to analyse the relationships 
between productivity and innovation but also to obtain a better understanding of characteristics that 
enhance a firm’s productivity. The debt pressure and the ownership structure of the firm are some 
of the characteristics mentioned in the literature.  
 
The rest of paper is organised as follows. The second section describes the theoretical framework 
of the relationship between the intensity of competition and the innovation performance of firms 
and productivity growth. The third section reveals the characteristics of the panel data used and 
presents the main descriptive statistics obtained from the accounting information companies, 
paying special attention to the differences between openness and non-openness firms. Section four 
presents the formal specification of the production function at individual level and the econometric 
tools applied. Section five presents the results of the econometric work and some robustness checks 
applying the GMM method and the Heckman equation, and section six concludes the paper with 
main results obtained and the implication of the results for competition policy. 
 
2. Market Competition and Productivity: Theoretical Background 
 
This section offers a theoretical survey about the role of market competition in promoting 
efficiency gains and productivity growth at firm level. It is well known that for several decades, the 
growth accounting approach was the dominant methodology for empirical studies of productivity. 
Solow’s model (1957) decomposes growth into contributions from the growth rates of factor inputs 
weighted by competitive factor shares plus a ‘residual’ term interpreted as exogenous technological 
progress. However, as Griliches points out, Solow’s residual is a "measure of our ignorance" 
because many factors can cause a shift in the production function, such as technical, organisational 
and institutional change. The growth accounting approach does not identify the mechanism through 
which real-world growth is actually sustained. In this sense, neoclassical growth theory does not 
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explain the different patterns of growth and productivity rates across countries, industries and firms 
(Carlaw and Lipsey, 2003). The real world of the markets differs from the theoretical models when 
the agents are similar, because in the markets the heterogeneity of firms predominates.  
 
However, in the accounting approach, the sources of economic growth have been concerned mainly 
with the analysis of technical change and aggregate growth in modern economies with identical 
agents. Usually, in this framework the concept of competition is interpreted as a state of apparent 
equilibrium in which well-informed agents treat prices parametrically and promote allocative 
efficiency for the whole economy. Yet the mechanism of perfect competition is quite divorced from 
the original and real concept of competition as a process of rivalry (Vickers, 1995). The second 
concept of competition originally appears in the works of classical economists –Smith, Mill, among 
others. In this second perspective the competition is interpreted as a process where the agents react 
to incentives conditioning their performance and affecting the productive and dynamic efficiency 
of industries. Competition is a dynamic process of rivalry that promotes the exit of low-
productivity firms, provides incentives for incumbents to reduce shortcomings and invest in R&D 
to increase their efficiency and promotes market dynamics2.  
 
In spite of the empirical evidence, traditional frameworks of Industrial Organization and Growth 
Theory offer little information about firm heterogeneity, the intensity of market turnover and the 
relationship between market competition and growth. The leading theoretical models in industrial 
organization (see Tirole, 1988) and economic growth (see Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 1995) predicted 
that more intense market competition discourages innovation and growth.  
 
The traditional industrial organization models assume that when market competition increases the 
income of innovative firms decreases and it discourages firms to invest in R&D activities. Usually, 
in this framework, the entry of new firm captures the notion of innovation and reduces the expected 
income of incumbents. But the trade-off between incumbents and entrants is ambiguous. If we ask 
ourselves who will invest more in R&D in the innovation race, the incumbent or the entrant, the 
answer is ambiguous (Aghion and Griffit, 2005). Here, there is a tension between static and 
dynamic efficiency. Sometimes, the barriers of mobility reduce the dynamic forces of creation and 
innovation in new firms, but it is necessary to distinguish between a firm being able to innovate in 
a new field, and being able to imitate what others have done. In the first case, market dynamics 
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promotes the innovation and, in the second case, market dynamics decreases the incentives of 
incumbents to innovate3. 
 
In recent years new information has appeared in the theoretical literature of endogenous growth 
provided by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Jones (1995) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), among 
others. They offer a new view when interpreting innovation as a significant engine of growth. In 
these models a decentralized market economy provides adequate incentives for the rapid 
accumulation of technology and they show how investments in knowledge play a critical role in the 
long-run growth process (see a survey in Cameron, 1998). As Grossman and Helpman (1991) point 
out, new growth theory has taken a step in the right direction by including aspects of reality –
imperfect competition, firm heterogeneity, incomplete apropiability, international interdependence 
and increasing returns- that are clearly important to understanding how the economies provide 
incentives in firm profits to create knowledge and develop innovations. 
From a Schumpeterian perspective, in recent years different models of new theory growth have 
appeared. Aghion and Howitt (1992) present a model where firms make intentional investments in 
R&D and these may produce new types of goods or improve the quality of existing goods. The 
innovative activities of firms are the main source of economic growth in the long run (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998). From this perspective the creative destruction process is the main driving force of 
economic growth because innovative firms discover new goods and make old products obsolete 
and therefore firms go bankrupt and their capital equipment also becomes obsolete. A great deal of 
attention has been paid to how the innovative process may differ across countries and across 
industries, either in terms of differing levels of human capital, physical capital, public 
infrastructures, and market competition (Aghion and Griffith, 2005). 
 
In addition, various recent contributions (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Howitt and Aghion, 1998; 
Howitt, 1999) have combined capital accumulation with R&D and the innovation process. Capital 
accumulation and innovation should not be treated as distinct causal factors because they are two 
aspects of the same process. On the one hand, physical and human capital plays a crucial role in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2  See a survey about market competition in Vickers (2001) and Boone (2000). 
3 Structural and strategic barriers reduce entry, intra-industry mobility, and exit. In so doing, they do not 
merely impede the ability of markets to weed out the inefficient, they also reduce the competitive pressures 
which promote innovation as the mechanism of, or the response to, entry by new firms (Geroski and 
Jacquemin, 1988). 
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innovation activities and in the application of new technologies resulting from innovation activities. 
On the other hand, new technologies open up new economic opportunities for investment in 
physical and human capital. Howitt and Aghion (1998) develop an integrated model with 
innovation and physical capital accumulation, where long-run growth depends on both innovation 
and physical capital accumulation technologies; and government policies that affect these two 
activities have permanent effects on growth. 
 
In contrast to the first neo-Schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by 
outsider firms which earn no income if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do 
innovate (Aghion and Hovitt, 1992; Caballero and Jaffe, 1993), the new models find that the usual 
Schumpeterian effect of more intense market product competition (MPC) is almost always 
outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition (Aghion 
et al, 2001). Now we are in a new technological environment where information and 
communication technologies play a central role in technological change in a wide range of markets, 
where the dynamic competition for the market is more important than static price/output 
competition in the market (Evans and Schmalensee, 2001).  
 
The role of market competition 
 
The theoretical framework predicts that there are three fundamental channels through which 
competition may affect a firm’s performance (Bucci, 2003). Firstly, the discipline effect of 
competition shifts the price towards the marginal cost, which forces the exit of low-productivity 
firms from the market and facilitates a more efficient allocation of factors –capital and labour- 
across high-productivity firms (allocative efficiency). Secondly, pressure on profit margins 
influence firms’ incentives to reduce slack (productive efficiency). Thirdly, changes in the level of 
market rivalry promote innovation and dynamic markets –entry, exit, selection or adaptation of 
firms- (dynamic efficiency). In this sense, dynamic competition will force firms to innovate in order 
to survive. Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” notion is a classical example of the trade-off 
between static and dynamic efficiency. Dynamic competition is a process where new firms develop 
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innovations and compete with incumbents,4 and dynamic efficiency is a key factor in productivity 
growth (Nicolletti and Scarpetta, 2003). 
 
However, the relevant issue is not the market competition per se but firms’ incentives to innovate 
and change. Some basic questions to address with regard to this point: When does market 
competition encourage innovation and when does it not? What are the levels of market competition 
at which the incentive effect or disincentive effect on innovation predominates? Do the effects of 
market competition on productivity growth differ between markets –external and domestic 
markets- and firm characteristics? Evidently, the relationship between market competition and 
productivity is not a simple one. On the one hand, considerable interactions may exist between 
market competition and a firm’s productivity growth. The theoretical predictions on the effects of 
competition on a firm’s incentives are a priori ambiguous. On the other hand, competition provides 
an incentive for technological change and innovation, but competition discourages laggards to 
adapt to outsiders’ innovations if the differences in productivity levels are important5.   
 
In recent years, interest in understanding the relationship between market competition and a firm’s 
incentives to innovate has increased considerably6. In a first sample of industrial organization 
papers firms usually were symmetric and the number of firms in the market was exogenous (Arrow, 
1962; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). Later, a new sample of models appeared where firms differed 
in efficiency levels, and the role of the dynamic market was highlighted (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 
Boone, 2001). 
 
These new theoretical contributions and the access of individual panel data in industrialized 
countries offered an interesting opportunity to explore the empirical relationship between market 
                                                          
4 Gerosky (1989) using a sample of 79 UK industries during 1976-1979 explores the effects of competition 
on productivity growth rates, and finds competition plays a significant role in stimulating productivity. 
Domestic entry rates accounts for at least 30 per cent of TFP growth. 
5 The impact of MPC on dynamic efficiency is ambiguous and more difficult to identify, because it changes 
during the market life-cycle. In this sense firm dynamics play a central role in the innovation process and the 
productivity growth (Ahn, 2003). 
6 The relationship between price-cost margins and the intensity of competition is not simple. On the one 
hand, some of the most competitive markets with large sunk investments or large R&D investments have 
high price-cost margins. On the other hand, in the market it is price rather than innovation that is the 
principal driver of competition. The relationship between concentration and competition is ambiguous, 
except at very high levels of concentration. An increase in competition can lead to increased concentration as 
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competition, innovation and productivity growth. Along these lines, Gerosky (1995), Nickell 
(1996), Blundell et al (1999), Aghion et al (2005) and other scholars produced some interesting 
results. Recent empirical studies indicate that competition promotes the productivity growth 
because it exerts pressure on firms to reduce costs and innovate in order to maintain market 
position, by introducing new products or new production processes. From the dynamic perspective, 
competition pressure has a positive effect of an incumbent’s innovation activities and promotes 
market dynamics –entry, exit, selection, growth, failure of firms- and reveals a positive correlation 
between market competition and productivity growth. Aghion et al (2005) observe a range of 
industries using the data of UK firms over the period 1968-1996. They find that an inverted U-
shaped relationship exists between PMC and innovation.   
 
In general, these empirical analyses differ from Schumpeter’s conjecture in that they find that a 
positive or inverse U-shaped relationship may exist between competition, innovation, productivity 
and growth at firm and industry level (see the survey in Boone, 2000). Empirical research finds that 
when the level of market competition is low, firms may have few incentives to improve efficiency 
and productivity growth; but when the level of competition rises, a positive impact on productivity 
appears. At the other end of the competition spectrum, when competition is strong enough to keep 
price equal to marginal costs, firms do have not the incentives to recoup investments in 
productivity enhancement and productivity tends to stagnate.  
 
The empirical evidence supporting the theoretical framework is not always unequivocal, and we 
need to provide empirical evidence from different countries and markets in order to understand 
more clearly what happens when the level of competition rises in relation to a firm’s incentives to 
improve productivity gains. The following section provides empirical evidence for a range of 
Spanish manufacturing firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
aggressive competition reallocates profits from inefficient firms to more efficient firms, causing inefficient 
firms to exit and market concentration to increase. 
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3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The sample of firms used belongs to the Spanish Business Register. The Business Register database 
contains data on employment, the activity sector, sales, exports and imports, debts and profits for 
all the firms with more than 10 employees and sales in excess of 60,000 euros.  The panel data used 
in this paper covers all manufacturing firms with more than 250 employees registered on the 
Spanish Business Register. Our panel data collects yearly information from 1994 to 2004. Here we 
used an unbalanced panel of 9,441 observations of 1,327 manufacturing firms from 1994 to 2004. 
On average the available data for each firm was observed for 7.11 years.  
 
Our source data contains information on the firm’s accounts, foreign market behaviour, shareholder 
capital distribution, location, asset value, number of employees, sales, income, profits, financial 
and labour expenditures.  
 
This study applied econometric techniques to analyse two aspects of market competition: the 
relationship between market competition and productivity growth rates and the determinants of 
productivity growth at firm level. In this sense, we pay special attention to two aspects of dynamic 
markets. On the one hand, the openness of the firm to foreign markets. We consider an openness 
firm one that usually exports and imports and non-openness firm one that does not. On the other 
hand, market turbulence is measured by the entry of new firms and the exit of incumbent firms.  
 
(Table 1) 
 
We begin with the data description of openness and non-openness firms between 1994 and 2004. 
The annual average TFP growth in Spanish manufacturing firms during the period 1994-2004 was 
0.91 per cent; the annual rate of output growth measured by added value was 7.82 per cent and the 
annual rate of input growth was 6.91 per cent. In manufacturing industries the TFP growth is the 
highest in the Spanish economy, but smaller than that of other EU members. This is a critical point 
that explains why the Spanish economy has lost its level of competitiveness, particularly in external 
trade. In fact, in recent years the gap between exports and imports has increased and the balance of 
payments presents a deficit that is untenable in the long term.  
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A comparison of TFP growth among openness and non-openness firms reveals that openness offers 
a slight premium in terms of productivity. In openness firms the annual rate of TFP growth is 0.92 
per cent compared to 0.90 per cent for non-openness firms. However, there are important 
differences in the sources of productivity7. The output growth of openness firms recorded an 
average rate of 7.82%, lower than the 8.54% recorded for non-openness firms. On the other hand, 
the input growth of openness firms is the 6.46%, lower than the 7.65% recorded for non-openness 
firms. The sources of inputs reveal notable differences in the labour input measured by number of 
workers, given that labour growth in openness firms is 0.98% compared to the 1.49% recorded by 
non-openness firms. 
 
Spanish manufacturing firms display notable differences in internal characteristics. Our database 
offers interesting information about the size, age, profitability, firm level and financial pressure. 
Openness firms are older and larger than non-openness firms. In addition, there are slight 
differences with regard to profitability and financial pressure. On the one hand, firm profitability 
levels are higher in openness firms. On the other, financial pressure is lower than in non-openness 
firms. 
 
The database contains information on dynamic firms and reveals the patterns of new firms and 
incumbents during the period 1994-2004. If we observe the descriptive statistics of two samples –
the surviving firms and the entrants- the differences are very clear: entrants ensure higher TFP 
growth, especially through sales growth compared to incumbent firms. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of surviving and failing incumbents and entrants. On the one hand, the first 
group refers to incumbents during the period 1994 to 2004. These firms were created before the 
initial observed period and survived until 2004. The second group refers to firms created before 
1994 but failing during the period 1994 to 2004. Finally, the third group refers to entering firms 
during the observation period. We expect a different pattern among these three groups.  
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Openness firms have a higher average TFP level than non-openness firms, but the differences in the 
evolution of the TFP growth rate between these samples are more moderate. For TFP level differences 
between exporting and non-exporting firms in Spain see Delgado et al (2002) and for Germany see Matthias 
and Hussinger (2005).  
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Results provide strong evidence of the displacement effect. In fact, new entrants perform better 
than incumbents. New entrants obtain TFP growths of 2.02% while incumbents on average obtain a 
TFP growth of 0.79%. New entrants seem to display better behaviour. However, their larger 
standard deviation shows that there are heterogeneous firm patterns within this group. In fact, 
theoretical and empirical literature points out that entrants have a dual effect. On the one hand, a 
disciplinary effect on the market because they diminish excessive profits. On the other hand, they 
pressure innovation because they introduce innovations or because they pressurise the rest of the 
firms to innovate (Gerosky and Jacquemin, 1985).  
 
Moreover, competition plays an important role in selecting more efficient firms from less efficient 
ones (Boone, 2000). In markets with more competitive pressure, firms are punished more severely 
in terms of profits for a drop in efficiency. When competition increases, the selection effect plays 
an important role in determining the survival possibilities of the firms (Vickers, 1995). In this sense 
our sample shows different patterns between surviving and failing incumbents. Due to the 
restrictions of our database, we do not know whether a firm has closed completely or whether it has 
been acquired by another firm. The difference between such firms is important. The first case is 
related to the inefficient behaviour of firms. In the second case, firms may be acquired due to their 
good performance. Given that our sample contains firms with more than 250 employees, 
incumbents should be firms with a certain market power in the market, and new entrants with more 
than 250 employees must be firms with positive expectations for their future behaviour. Our results 
show that failing incumbents have a higher TFP growth rate with a value of 0.98%, while surviving 
firms’ TFP growth rate is 0.73%. However, heterogeneity obtains a large value for failing 
incumbents.  
 
With regard to output growth, new entrants obtain larger output growth than incumbents. On the 
one hand, new entrants’ output growth achieves 14.61% on average while for incumbents the 
average value is 7.11%. On the other hand, we should also highlight differences in firm 
profitability measured with the Lerner index. While incumbents obtain an average value of 2.18%, 
new entrants obtain -0.71%. These results show that incumbents may increase the price over the 
cost, while new entrants find it more difficult to compete in the market and have to fix a lower 
price. 
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4. Productivity, Market Competition and Firm Characteristics  
 
The division between theory and empirical evidence provides an interesting setting for 
understanding the effect of market competition over the driving forces of economic growth. To 
tackle this division, in a first step we pay special attention to the relationship between competition 
and productivity growth at firm level. Then, in a second step we will incorporate a range of firm 
and sectoral characteristics.  
 
4.1. Determinants of firm productivity 
 
In our model, the representative firm has a technology with constant scale economies of productive 
factors and its level of productivity depends on its efficiency level from its technology (Campbell, 
1997). The production function of the i’th firm at period t is given by, 
 
     ( )tititititi MLKAFQ ,,,,, ,,,=      [ 1 ]  
 
where Q measures output (in this case total sales), K is a measure of physical capital, L is the 
number of employees, A is a productivity index and M is the value of other intermediate inputs. 
Applying logarithms and taking differences respect the time; the output growth rate has the 
following expression: 
 
   titMtitLtitKtitAti dmdldkdadq ,,,,,,,,, εεεε +++=   [ 2 ]  
 
where dqt , dat , dkt , dlt and dmt  are growth rates calculated as differences of the logarithmic value 
of the sales, Hicks’ neutral technical change, the capital stock, number of employees and the 
intermediate materials. Finally, tX ,ε  is the elasticity of output in respect of each factor from the 
production function. 
 
If the production function does not exhibit constant scale economies (Hall, 1986), the production 
function F(.) will be homogeneous to degree γ, in respect of the capital stock, labour and the 
intermediate materials ( γεεε =++ tMtLtK ,,, ) and homogeneous to degree one in respect of the 
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technical progress ( 1, =tAε ). Firms have a certain level of market power (Hall, 1986) and their 
price-demand elasticity is εt. Incorporating this assumption within the production function8:  
 
        ( ) ( )tititMitititKitititi dldmdldkdldadq ,,,,,,,,, −+−++= αμαμγ   [3] 
   
Therefore, the output growth from a firm i in period t depends on four different factors: variations 
in the global productivity; the elasticity of scale; the variations from the capital-worker relationship 
weighted by the price-cost margin and the factor contribution in the output; and the variations from 
the material-worker relationship weighted by the price-cost margin and the factor contribution in 
the output. 
 
In expression [3] the productivity captures the improvements in technical efficiency in the presence 
of elasticities of scale and market power. The rate of change in the global productivity of the 
factors will differ from Solow’s residual to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the magnitude 
of the returns to scale and the presence of market power in the industrial sectors. Taking into 
account that Solow’s residual includes the variations in output not accounted for by the changes in 
the use of the productive factors from the above expression we can easily derive an equation in 
which the dependent variable is not the output but Solow’s residual: 
 
       titMtitKtitLtiti dmdkdldqTFP ,,,,,,,, ααα −−−=       [4] 
 
From equation [3]: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tititMitititKitititi dldmdldkdldaTFP ,,,,,,,,, 111 −−+−−+−+= αμαμγ  [5] 
 
                                                          
8 If μi is the price-cost margin from firm “i” (μi = Pi /CMi), elasticities may be expressed as a function of 
price-cost margin and the contributions of the factors to the output:                                     
ε μ μ αXij
Xij ij
ij ij
Xij ij
ij ij ij
ij Xij
P X
CM Y
P X
P Y
= ⋅ ⋅ =
⋅
⋅ = ⋅
 
where PXi  and Xi  represent the price and the number of productive factors, μi is the price-cost margin and α i 
is the contribution of each factor to the output. 
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However, the productivity change (dai,t) may be decomposed into different variables related to the 
level of competence in the markets in which a firm operates and different explanatory variables of 
the firm’s characteristics: 
 
                             ijititiijij udXMCMCda ++++= 32,2,1 βββθ    
 
Where MC and MC2 is a degree of competence and its quadratic value in the industry and X is a 
vector of individual and sectoral variables. If we introduce those parameters in [5], we obtain: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) titititMitititKititititiiti udldmdldkdlXMCMCTFP ,,,,,,,,,32,1,1, 111 +−−+−−+−++++= αμαμγβββθ  [6] 
 
This will be our main equation of interest where the TFP growth depends on the market 
competence, a vector of individual and sectoral variables, the growth rate of the number of 
employees, the growth of the intensity of capital per worker, and the growth of the intensity of 
intermediate materials per worker.  
 
4.2. Econometric estimation 
 
As we have seen previously, our sample shows a heterogeneous behaviour which may affect the 
estimations of β’s due to sample attrition bias. In particular, if a firm’s productivity goes under a 
certain threshold level, this usually implies a serious profitability problem for the firm. Therefore, 
this firm is likely to be closed down and will drop out of the data set. Conversely, if the firm’s 
productivity goes over a certain threshold level, then the firm is likely to be acquired by another 
firm and will also drop out of the data set. This correlation between data truncation and 
productivity may produce a sample selection bias if we apply an ordinary least squares equation.  
 
In order to deal with this bias, we classify firms into three types depending on their entry and exit 
patterns between year 0 and year T. Type-1 firms are survivors that remain in the market between 
year 0 and year T. Type-2 firms are exiters that are present in year 0 but exit the market before year 
T. Type-3 firms are entrants that start their business after year 0. Whether or not productivity is 
observed depends on the patterns of entry and exit. The entry and exit variations lead to the missing 
data for the dependent or independent variables.  
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Classification of firms depending on the date of birth and death. 
 Year 0 Year T Independent 
variables at 0 
Dependent variables 
at T 
Type-1 Survivors observable observable observable observable 
Type-2 Exiters observable missing observable missing 
Type-3 
Entrants 
missing observable Missing observable 
 
 
We first consider the firms that are observed in year 0 (Type-1 and Type-2 firms). For these two 
types of firms, the independent variables xi0 are always observable. The problem is that the TFP at 
the end of the period is not observed for Type-2 firms because they exit between year 0 and year T. 
Thus, our regression equation may be rewritten as: 
 
iTiiT xy μβ +′= 0  
 
Where yiT, 0ix′  and β are the TFPiT, the explanatory variables and a vector of the parameters of the 
explanatory variables from our equation of interest [6]. Suppose that the firm i’s survival in year T  
depends on the productivity and other firm characteristics in year 0, ( ),...,,,1 3020100 iiii xxxZ =′ : 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ ≥+′=
otherwise
Zif
SURVIVAL
iTi
iT
0
01 0 υγ
         
 
Where  
( ) ( )1,000 NandZyE iTiiT ≈= υ  
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It is possible to estimate consistently through a maximum likelihood (ML) method. The log-
likelihood function of the sample selection model for firm i, lnLi, is:  
 
( )
{ }⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
=′−Φ
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′−−
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
′−+′Φ
=
0
1
2
1
1
/
ln
ln
0
2
0
2
00
iTi
iT
iiTiiTi
i
sifZn
sifxyxyZ
L
γ
σ
β
ρ
σρβ
 
 
where Φ(·) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. The key estimate β is obtained 
from the ML estimate of the parameters of the previous equation using the data set including both 
surviving (Type-1) firms and exiting (Type-2) firms. 
 
So far, the effect of entry has not been considered. However, entrants (Type-3 firms) are not likely 
to introduce bias. In the case of entries, exiting firms dropping out of the observed data set are not 
likely to be correlated to their productivity level. If there is no systematic relationship between 
entry and productivity after entry, or entry is randomly determined independently of subsequent 
development, then the aforementioned ML method yields a consistent estimator.  
 
Therefore, the appropriate econometric method to resolve this problem is the two-step method 
suggested by Heckman (1979). This requires the introduction of an additional explanatory variable 
in the least squares regression – the inverse Mill’s Ratio – obtained from a probit model on firm 
survival. The probit equation we use is 
 
tiiii uMESGERGXRAgeSizeSURVIVAL ,54321994,12000, ++++++= βββββα  
 
Where SURVIVAL is 1 if the firm i has survived until 2004, and 0 if it has closed. Although this 
Heckman estimator is consistent, it is not fully efficient. Efficient estimates can be obtained by 
applying an iterative procedure that uses the estimates from the Heckman procedure as starting 
values and will lead, on convergence, to maximum likelihood estimates (Maddala, 1983; Weiss, 
1998). Our estimations find that Mill’s ratio is not significant, which would suggest that there is not 
a significant sample selection bias. However the significance of parameters ρ and σ in the ML 
estimation shows that we have to consider an important bias introduced by the existence of firms 
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that disappeared over the period of analysis. This alternative set of estimators are reported in the 
following section. 
 
5. Results 
 
This section presents the econometric results in two stages. Firstly, we reveal the relationship 
between the level of market competition and the TFP growth rate. Secondly, we introduce in the 
econometric specification a vector of individual characteristics of the firms and a vector of industry 
variables.  
 
5.1. Productivity and Market Competition 
 
As we have seen previously the relationship between market competition and productivity is not 
simple. Competition can increase productivity rates through a more efficient relocation of factors, 
an increase in the turnover of firms in the market and also through more innovation in new firms or 
incumbents. However, these effects differ according to market characteristics, the life cycle and 
internal characteristics of the firms. This section applies an econometric specification to measure 
the effect of market competition on the productivity growth in Spanish manufacturing firms during 
the period 1994-2004. The information contained in our database allows us to obtain an index of 
TFP and market competition at firm level. Productivity growth is measured as the Solow residual, 
and the market competition is estimated as one minus the Lerner Index. When the value of the 
market competition variable is close to zero, the level of competition is low; when its value rises, 
the market competition increases (see Annexe 1).  
 
In order to estimate the relationship between productivity and competition, we apply a Heckman 
equation and a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. The GMM estimator, 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1990, 1991), is based on analysing the distribution of the 
diverse moments that characterise a variable. The main advantage of GMM is its control over the 
presence of unobserved firm-specific effects and over the endogeneity of the current-dated 
explanatory variables9. However, our data may suffer from sample attrition bias because we have 
                                                          
9 Our GMM estimator reveals that there is a significant U-shaped relationship between productivity and 
competition. However, this relationship changes to an inverted U-shaped relationship between both variables 
when the non-openness of firms is analysed. This change reinforces our argument that openness and non-
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some incumbents exiting the market. Therefore, we decided to apply a Heckman equation with 
iterative ML estimates. Our ML estimations show that parameters ρ and σ have to be considered 
because there is an important bias introduced by the existence of firms that disappeared during the 
period of analysis.  
 
We also apply a Granger causality test to check for the direction of causality between the TFP and 
the level of competition. Results show that the competition level Granger causes the level of 
industrial relationship because the F-test is equal to 53.69 (with a p-value of 0.000) while TFP does 
not Granger cause the competition level because the F-test is equal to 1.43 (with a p-value of 
0.2311).  
 
Table 2 offers the estimation of equation [6] where the TFP equation depends on the competition 
variables and the scale economies of the product function at firm level. In the first place, the 
competition index has an inverted U-shape effect on the TFP equation. That means that the 
competition index has a positive effect on productivity until it reaches a point where competition 
does not provide an incentive for the introduction of innovation in the market. The empirical 
evidence of the relationship between competition level and innovation or productivity growth is 
rather ambiguous and still far from conclusive. The empirical literature may be grouped in two 
different waves.  
 
The first wave is the preliminary set of empirical studies by Gerosky (1995), Nickell (1996), 
Blundell et al (1999) and Disney et al (2000) and suggests that a positive relationship may exist 
between competition, innovation and productivity growth. Nickell (1996), with a sample of 676 
UK firms over the period 1975-1986, found that: i) market power reduces productivity levels, ii) 
competition is associated with higher rates of TFP growth and iii) competition measured with the 
level of firm income is associated with a higher level and faster growth rates of TFP. And Disney 
et al. (2000), with a larger data set of around 143,000 UK establishments over the period 1980-
1992, found that market competition significantly increased productivity levels as well as 
productivity growth rates. However, Scherer (1965) for 448 US firms in the base year 1955 found 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
openness firms behave differently. The different sign between openness and non-openness may be due to the 
fact that the selection process in the market is not taken into account. The reason is that exiters have a higher 
TFP growth than surviving incumbents. Therefore, their impact on our equation of interest is larger than the 
effect of the incumbents remaining active in the market until 2004.  
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that inventive output measured by patents is not systematically related to variation in market power 
or prior profitability. 
 
In recent years, new studies have found empirical evidence in favour of the competition-
productivity relationship. However, they point out that when market competition is low, increase in 
pressure promotes productivity growth but when it is high the increased pressure has a negative 
effect on productivity growth. Aghion et al (2001) find that the effect of PMC on growth is usually 
monotonically positive, but sometimes inverse-U shaped. Aghion et al (2002) developed a 
Schumpeterian growth model in which firms innovate ‘step-by-step’ and for the sample of 330 UK 
firms during the period 1991-1994 the empirical results confirm that the relationship between 
product market competition at industry level and innovation is an inverted U-shaped curve. In this 
respect our results are in line with this second wave of empirical studies. 
 
In the second place, the parameters related to the scale economies of the product function show that 
an increase in the growth of workers has a negative effect on the TFP. This is a reasonable result 
given higher labour intensity has a negative effect on firm productivity. Conversely, the effect of 
the growth of the capital and the materials per workers on the TFP is positive.  
 
With regard to the difference between openness and non-openness firms, some interesting 
differences appear in the values of the coefficients. On the one hand, firms open to foreign markets 
present lower coefficients for the parameters related to competition than non-openness firms. On 
the other hand, firms open to foreign markets present higher coefficients for the parameters related 
to the production function than non-openness firms. Our results show that firms operating in the 
domestic market react more when competition increases but decrease their TFP growth when 
competition is high. In fact, Aghion et al (2005) find that the inverted U-shape is steeper when 
industries are more neck-and-neck. 
 
Therefore, the Competition index offers a positive relationship between competition and TFP 
growth. But the level of significance of the value of the parameters differs between openness and 
non-openness firms. Of course, for openness firms the parameter is positive but not significant at 
the usual level, and for non-openness firms the result is very clear, the value of parameter increases 
and the level of significance is high. The Square of Competition index shows that the relationship 
between competition level and productivity growth describes a inverted U-shaped curve, especially 
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in non-openness firms. The level of significance is high in the three groups of firms and shows the 
presence of Schumpeterian effect when the level of competition market is higher. 
 
(Table 2) 
 
An important extension of econometric estimation would be to calculate the Kernel equation 
between market competition and TFP growth. The graphical representation of the Kernel equation 
differs between openness and non-openness firms. For the firm oriented towards foreign markets 
the TFP growth rate is stable at lower levels of market competition, but when  competition rises 
TFP growth falls. We find that when openness firms operate in markets with high levels of 
competition the Schumpeterian effect appears and the capacity of firm to invest in new equipment 
and R&D activities decreases. Finally, in the group of non-openness firms the results of the Kernel 
equation confirm the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between market competition 
and TFP growth.  
 
(Graph 1) 
 
These results indicate that at the lowest levels of market competition an escape-competition effect 
predominates, whereas at high levels of market competition the Schumpeterian effect appears. Our 
results describe the inverted U-shaped relationship, particularly when the firm operates in domestic 
markets. 
 
5.2. Productivity and firm determinants 
 
The next step of our analysis identifies the firm characteristics that affect productivity growth. The 
database offers information about firm size measured by employees, age measured in years, 
financial pressure measured by debt, and capital firm structure measured by the proportion of total 
capital represented by the three main shareholders (see Annexe 1). The econometric Heckman 
estimation offers interesting results, which are shown in table 3. 
 
The relationship between firm size and TFP growth is negative at the level of significance in our 
three samples. These results show that medium-sized firms obtain higher productivity growth, in 
addition to a range of empirical works than show that small and medium-sized firms increased their 
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productivity levels. Furthermore, firm age has a negative and significant relationship with TFP 
growth. Firm age normally correlates with other variables at firm level such as size, wages, capital 
structure, financial pressure and productivity. However, our results suggest that medium and young 
firms increase their productivity levels more.  
 
(Table 3) 
 
In the empirical estimations we included financial pressure, measured by the firm’s level of debt in 
relation to total liabilities. The results are statistically significant and show the a positive link 
between financial pressure and productivity growth. This positive effect of financial pressure on 
productivity is especially relevant in openness firms. When the firm operates in external markets, 
an increase in debt repayment obligations increases the tension in the organization and causes an 
improvement in the efficiency of managers and employees. Furthermore, when financial pressure 
increases the managers work harder to minimize bankruptcy risks (Aghion and Griffith, 2005). 
 
Our results are in line with the preliminary empirical works. Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) found 
that firms faced with financial pressure respond by increasing their efforts to increase productivity. 
When financial pressure increases at firm level they found this had a large negative effect on 
employment, a small negative effect on wage increases and a small positive effect on the level of 
productivity. The aforementioned paper by Aghion et al (2002) found empirical evidence that firms 
with greater financial pressure innovate more than those with lower financial pressure, as predicted 
by the theoretical framework, and higher debt pressure reinforces the escape-competition effect and 
enhances innovation incentives at lower levels of market competition. 
 
Finally, we incorporate a proxy measure of the ownership structure at firm level. The variable used 
is the share of three main firm shareholders. Our results show that the effect of the ownership 
concentration has a positive impact on productivity growth. However, the coefficient is not 
significant probably due to the static nature of this variable. Our results coincide with previous 
empirical works which found that ownership concentration affects the efficiency of strategic 
orientation, reduces agency tension and increases firm productivity. In a sample of UK firms, 
Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997) f0und that the effect of larger shareholders on productivity 
growth is positive. However, the current results for Spanish manufacturing firms found a 
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moderately positive but not statistically significant relationship between shareholder concentration 
and productivity growth. 
 
However, the empirical evidence is far from agreement on the link between shareholder 
concentration and productivity. For a sample of Scottish firms, Acs and Isberg (1991) observed that 
innovation is not related to ownership structure. Conversely, Leech and Leahy (1991) analysed UK 
firms and found that there is a positive relationship between firm growth and ownership 
concentration and the control of the manager. In reference to different samples of Spanish 
manufacturing firms, Galve and Salas (1993) observed a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm results, while Ortega, Moreno and Suriñach (2005) found that a high degree 
of ownership concentration and the use of debt financing serve to dissuade a firm from incurring 
R&D expenditure. 
In reference to the cyclical variables, we find that there is an anticyclical evolution of GDP growth 
and TFP growth. Therefore, positive GDP growth has a negative effect on TFP growth. Concerning 
the sectoral variables, import penetration and medium efficient size have a positive impact on TFP 
growth. However, their effect is not significant.   
6. Conclusions 
 
The results presented in the paper indicate that market competition is a key factor in improving 
productivity growth in Spanish manufacturing firms. In order to analyse the role of competition in 
productivity growth we first asked some questions: What is the relationship between firm 
productivity and competition? Why has Spanish productivity in manufacturing industries slowed 
down since the nineties? Why do Spanish firms suffer from productivity stagnation? All these 
questions have driven our analysis of the relationship between productivity and competition. 
Overall the results confirm the positive and complex effect of market competition on productivity 
growth at firm level. Despite the complexity between both variables, we think that we have cast 
some light on the empirical evidence.  
 
Our results show that competition has a dual effect for Spanish manufacturing firms. When 
competition levels are low, a rise in competition has a positive impact on firm productivity, yet 
once a productivity level is reached, competition has a negative impact on productivity. This 
inverted U-shaped impact is absolutely clear with non-openness firms, but the effect seems to be 
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more ambiguous with openness firms. This result shows that much of the domestic market still has 
low levels of competition, but when competition pressure rises it generates firms’ incentives to 
improve productivity growth. At the other end of the competition spectrum, in domestic markets 
with high competition levels when competition pressure rises it discourages firms to raise 
productivity levels. The displacement effect and the Schumpeterian effect play an important role in 
domestic markets  and the relationship between market competition and productivity growth 
produces an inverted U-shape in the sense that the productivity rate is highest at intermediate levels 
of competition. 
 
The effect of market competition when firms operate in international markets is different. In 
general, productivity growth in openness firms is higher than in non-openness firms, and when 
opening firms operate in markets with low competition levels productivity growth is higher. In this 
case, we found no evidence of the displacement effect when the competition pressure rises. 
However, in high levels of market competition an increase in competition pressure produces a fall 
in the productivity rate.  
 
In fact, it seems that openness firms depart from higher productivity growth rate than non-openness 
firms but they slowdown their productivity growth more rapidly in competitive markets. Therefore, 
it seems that the increase in the openness of Spanish market, first in 1986 with Spain’s entry in the 
European Economic Community and later by joining the Monetary European Union has been 
crucial for firm productivity. Higher competition implies lower productivity growth, particularly 
for openness firms.  
 
In relation to firms’ determinants of productivity growth we find clear evidence that internal 
characteristics play an important role in productivity growth. Young and small firms tend to 
increase productivity quicker. And financial pressure at firm level has a disciplinary and positive 
effect on productivity dynamics, particularly when the firm operates in external markets. Finally, 
the results show that the effect of ownership concentration has a positive and moderate impact on 
productivity growth.  
European competition policy aims to increase market flexibility, reduce barriers to entry and 
stimulate adaptability within large bureaucracies. This policy may erode the incentives of Spanish 
firms to increase their productivity in the short run. In this sense, the increase in competition and 
the incentive for productivity are the major challenges for Spanish policy makers. Perhaps the 
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answer to Spain’s sluggish productivity growth lies in the behaviour of Spanish firms. Perhaps the 
policy makers should try to modify the “animal spirits” driving firms, in order to improve 
productivity results. 
 
The involvement of policy makers is very interesting; especially in European countries when the 
barriers to market integration and competition policies play a crucial role in providing sufficient 
incentives to increase productivity growth at firm level. Our results find that competition policy 
needs to eliminate the competition barrier in domestic markets in order to achieve productivity 
improvements and that excessive external competition plays a negative role in productivity growth 
in economies like Spain which are far from the world’s technological frontier. 
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Annexe 1 - “The Variables”  
 
This Annexe describes the variables included in the empirical evidence. We have classified the 
variables into two different groups: i) Individual variables, ii) Sectoral variables. 
 
• Total Factor Productivity (TFP): Proxy of innovation which represents the increases of Total 
Factor Productivity. This measure adopts an output perspective because it takes into account the 
outcome from the production and not the expenses in R&D and other possible externalities. 
Source: SABI database. 
 ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]1,,1,,
1,,1,,,
1,,1,,
1,,
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5`0lnln
−−
−−
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where αK, αL and αM, are the contributions of the capital (K), labour (L) and the materials (M). 
L is the number of employees, M is the value of the intermediate consumptions and K is the 
capital stock in the firm. In order to estimate the capital stock we have used the Methodology of 
the Permanent Inventory with the following equation: 
1,,1,, −− ×−+= titititi KIKK δ  
where Ki,t is the stock of capital in period “t”, I is the firm investment and δ is the capital 
depreciation rate.  
 
• Growth workers (Δ (lit)): Difference of the logarithmic size between a period and the previous 
one. Source: SABI. 
 
• Growth capital per worker (Δ (kit - lit)): Difference between the growth in the capital and the 
growth in the number of employees over the same period of time. The growth in capital and 
workers is measured as the difference between the logarithmic value of capital and intermediate 
consumption. Source: SABI. 
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• Growth materials per worker (Δ (cit -lkit)): Difference between the growth of the logarithmic 
intermediate consumptions and the growth in the number of employees over the same period of 
time. The growth of intermediate consumptions and workers is measured as the difference 
between the logarithmic value of capital and intermediate consumption Source: SABI. 
 
• Competition index (MC): This variable measures the market competition in the market and it 
is calculated as 1 - the Lerner Index. Following Aghion et al. (2002), the Lerner Index is 
measured as operating profits net of depreciation and provisions minus an estimation of the 
financial cost of capital (cost of capital*capital stock) and divides this by the sales. This 
measure is similar to the Lerner Index but it has the advantage of avoiding the unobservable 
marginal cost. Source: SABI database.   
""
""""cos
11,
tinsales
tinifirmbytfinancialprofitoperating
indexLernerMC ti
−−=−=  
 
• Size: Logarithmic number of employees in a firm. The effect is ambiguous: some empirical 
studies find a positive relationship between firm size and innovation, but there are others which 
find a non-linear relationship (Scherer, 1965). Furthermore, this line follows the two 
Schumpeterian perspectives: 'Schumpeter Mark I' and 'Schumpeter Mark II'. In these two groups 
innovative activities are structured and organized in different ways. 'Schumpeter Mark I' implies 
a low concentration of innovative activities, innovators are of small economic size, there is an 
unstable ranking of innovators and high entry of new innovators. 'Schumpeter Mark II' presents 
a high concentration of innovative activities, innovators are of larger economic size, there is a 
stable ranking of innovators and the entry rate is low. Source: SABI. 
 
• Age: Logarithmic firm’ experience in the market. This variable is the logarithm of the difference 
between each year the firm is active and the year of creation. The relationship between age and 
innovation is unexpected: on the one hand, some industries will have technological breaks with 
the entrance of new firms; on the other hand, some industries introduce innovation with the 
research and innovation of older incumbents. This difference is due to industrial characteristics 
(sunk costs to develop technologies) or the existence of barriers to entry (artificial oligopolies). 
Source: SABI. 
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• Financial pressure (FP): Firms with a large amount of debt may have more incentives to 
innovate in order to be face up to their debts. Conversely, those firms with large amount of 
debts may encounter more problems since they may not be able to choose freely where to invest 
their capital (The will to maintain independence restricts financial resources for innovation, 
conversely, dependence may restrict the capacity to choose whether to invest in a risky project). 
Source: SABI. 
100
""""
""""exp
, ×=
tduringifirminpassiveTotal
tduringifirminendituresFinancialFP ti  
 
• Capital structure: Percentage of the capital owned by three largest shareholders. This variable 
represents the agency problems caused by asymmetrical information between managers and 
owners. Firms controlled by large shareholders may have less capacity to innovate due to 
problems of agency. Agency theory predicts that managers will act largely out of self-interest 
unless they are closely monitored by large block shareholders. Source: SABI. 
""% ifirminrsshareholdeprincipalthreethetobelongingsharesCSi =  
 
• Medium Efficient Size (MES): It measures the average of the number of employees by firm in 
the industry in which the firm operates. The existence of large average size implies the existence 
of barriers to entry in the industry. These barriers (natural or artificial in the industry) may 
stimulate the creation of innovations in order to deter the entrance of new firms. Source: 
Encuesta Industrial. 
""""sec
""""sec
,
tinstorinfirmsofnumber
tinstorinemployeesofnumberMES ts =  
 
• Import penetration: Ratio of imports and domestic sales in the industry. It measures the value 
of imports over home demand in the firm's industry. Therefore, it is a measure of the foreign 
competition. Source: Encuesta Industrial and Agencia Tributaria (Departamento de Aduanas e  
Impuestos Especiales).  
100
""""sec
""""secIm
, ×=
tinstorinsalesTotal
tinstorinportsIP ts  
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• Sectoral dummies: Manuf1 identifies firms belonging to food products and beverages sectors 
(CNAE 15), Manuf2 identifies firms belonging to the textile, leather clothing, leather tanning 
and preparation manufacturing sectors (CNAE 17 to 19), Manuf3 identifies firms belonging to 
the wood and cork sector (CNAE 20), Manuf4 identifies firms belonging to the paper products, 
publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media sector (CNAE 21 and 22), Manuf5 
identifies firms belonging to the chemical manufacturing sector (CNAE 24), Manuf6 identifies 
firms belonging to the rubber and plastic products sector (CNAE 25), Manuf7 identifies firms 
belonging to the other non-metallic mineral products sector (CNAE 26), Manuf8 identifies 
firms belonging to the basic metals and fabricated metal products sector (CNAE 27 and 28), 
Manuf9 identifies firms belonging to the machinery and equipment sector (CNAE 29), Manuf10 
identifies firms belonging to the electrical, electronic and optical equipment sector (CNAE 30 
to 33), Manuf11 identifies firms belonging to the Transport equipment sector (CNAE 34 to 35) 
and Manuf12 identifies firms belonging to the Furniture sector (CNAE 36). Source: SABI. 
 
• GDP growth: Percentage of GDP growth in the economy. This variable captures the effect of 
the Spanish economy on the PTF growth. 
 
• Gross Entry Rate (GER): Percentage of entrants’ sales each year over the total value in each 
industry. It represents the internal competition in the market as well as the degree of barriers to 
entry. Low barriers to entry foster innovation in neck-and-neck competitive industries, but it can 
discourage the creation of innovation when the threat of the entrance of new firms is unlikely. 
Source: SABI and Encuesta Industrial. 
100
""sec
""
, ×=
tperiodduringtortheinsalesTotal
tperiodduringentrantsnewofSalesGER ts  
 
• Gross Exit Rate (GXR): Percentage of exiters’ sales in the market each year and in each 
industry. This variable shows the selection process in the market. It is expected that those firms 
facing up to lower productivity will have to leave the market or innovate to survive. Source: 
SABI and Encuesta Industrial. 
100
""""sec
""""sec
, ×=
tinstorinsalesTotal
tinstorinexitersnewofSalesGXR ts
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Annexe 2. Tables and Graphs 
Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics of our data sample of firms. 
Period 1994-2004. 
 INCUMBENTS-ENTRANTS  OPENNESS 
 Incumbents   
 
All firms 
Survivors and 
failures Survivors Failures 
 
Entrants 
 Openness 
Firms 
Non-
openness 
Firms 
TFP 0.0091 
(0.1118) 
0.0079 
(0.107) 
0.0073 
(0.0989) 
0.0098 
(0.1295) 
0.0202 
(0.1491) 
 0.0092 
(0.1086) 
0.0090 
(0.1170) 
Output growth 0.0782 
(0.2953) 
0.0711 
(0.2691) 
0.0717 
(0.2546) 
0.0695 
(0.3101) 
0.1461 
(0.4739) 
 0.0738 
(0.2848) 
0.0854 
(0.3119) 
Inputs growth 0.0691 
(0.2689) 
0.0632 
(0.2490) 
0.0643 
(0.2392) 
0.0597 
(0.2776) 
0.1259 
(0.4098) 
 0.0646 
(0.2592) 
0.0765 
(0.2842) 
     Capital stock growth 0.0016 
(0.0146) 
0.0017 
(0.0149) 
0.0018 
(0.0135) 
0.0015 
(0.0187) 
0.0008 
(0.0113) 
 0.0016 
(0.0128) 
0.0017 
(0.0173) 
     Labour growth 0.0117 
(0.0808) 
0.0113 
(0.0792) 
0.0118 
(0.0765) 
0.0097 
(0.0869) 
0.0154 
(0.0950) 
 0.0098 
(0.0729) 
0.0149 
(0.0923) 
     Materials growth 0.0558 
(0.2306) 
0.0502 
(0.2107) 
0.0508 
(0.1991) 
0.0484 
(0.2433) 
0.1096 
(0.3670) 
 0.0533 
(0.2244) 
0.0599 
(0.2405) 
Average age 27.91 
(19.85) 
30.40 
(19.20) 
29.84 
(18.58) 
32.16 
(20.90) 
3.93 
(2.01) 
 29.45 
(19.85) 
25.36 
(19.58) 
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Average size (employees) 665.92 
(1274.71) 
661.20 
(1279.04) 
593.84 
(18.58) 
871.05 
(1718.44) 
711.32 
(1232.02) 
 710.72 
(1410.85) 
591.88 
(1007.13) 
Firm Profitability (Lerner) 0.0218  
(0.1126) 
0.0218 
(0.1126) 
0.0267  
(0.1126) 
0.0192 
(0.1336) 
-0.0071 
(0.1235) 
 0.0229  
(0.1130) 
0.0200  
(0.1119) 
Debt pressure 0.0332 
(0.1235) 
0.0342 
(0.1296) 
0.0336 
(0.1478) 
0.0361 
(0.0321) 
0.0236 
(0.0176) 
 0.0329 
(0.0272) 
0.0337 
(0.1980) 
Firms 1,327 1113 742 371 214  816 511 
Standard deviation in brackets. 
Source: the authors from SABI database. 
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Table 2: 
Productivity and Market Competition (Heckman estimationa) 
TFP equation All firms Openness
Firms 
Non-openness F
Δ (lit) -0.0601 
(0.0053)* 
-0.0861 
(0.0068)* 
-0.0488 
(0.0089)* 
Δ (kit - lit) 0.0251 
(0.0036)* 
0.0291 
(0.0043)* 
0.0124 
(0.0060)** 
Δ (cit -lkit)    0.0471 
(0.0035)* 
0.0575 
(0.0047)* 
0.0334 
(0.0053)* 
Competition index 0.1453 
(0.0724)** 
0.0913 
(0.0847) 
0.3978 
(0.1312)* 
Square Competition index -0.1182 
(0.0335)* 
-0.1081 
(0.0391)* 
-0.2249 
(0.0617)* 
Sectoral dummiesb  ? ? ? 
Constant -0.0191 
(0.0402) 
-0.0008 
(0.0465) 
-0.1937 
(0.0771)* 
ρ -0.0745 
(0.0977) 
0.7772 
(0.0479)* 
0.6127 
(0.0271)* 
σ -2.3021 
(0.0089)* 
-2.3008 
(0.0155)* 
-2.1292 
(0.0179)* 
Loglikelihood  0.33 
(0.5654) 
49.70 
(0.0000) 
18.71 
(0.0000) 
Observations 9441 5882 3559 
Censored obs. 2256 1547 709 
Standard deviation in brackets. 
a The selection equation includes the variables Size (logarithmic number of workers), Age 
(logarithmic firm age), GXR (percentage of sales of exiters), GER (percentage of sales of 
entrants) and MES (medium efficient size). 
b See Annexe 1 for a description of the sectoral dummies. 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10%. 
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Graph 1 
Kernel regression in openness and non-openness firms 
   2%
             1,5%
          1%
               0
,5%
 
      TFP growth 
                 0,25                        0,5 0                     0 ,75                           1  
Market Competition (1-Lerner Index) 
Note: Competition measure is normalized to one at the highest level of 
competition  
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Table 3. 
Determinants of Productivity Growth (Heckman estimation) 
TFP equation All firms Openness Firms  Non-openness Firms  
Δ (litt) -0.0722 
(0.0054)* 
-0.0880 
(0.0068)* 
-0.0513 
(0.0089)* 
Δ (kit - lit) 0.0234 
(0.0035)* 
0.0285 
(0.0043)* 
0.0112 
(0.0059)*** 
Δ (cit -lkit)    0.0459 
(0.0035)* 
0.0547 
(0.0048)* 
0.0343 
(0.0053)* 
Competition index 0.2267 
(0.0725)* 
0.0575 
(0.0851) 
0.3761 
(0.1310)* 
Square Competition 
index 
-0.1640 
(0.0336)* 
-0.0984 
(0.0391)* 
-0.2208 
(0.0614)* 
Size  -0.0103 
(0.00153)* 
-0.0082 
(0.0018)* 
-0.0112 
(0.0026)* 
Age -0.0085 
(0.0014)* 
-0.0084 
(0.0018)* 
-0.0084 
(0.0024)* 
Financial Pressure 0.0370 
(0.0082)* 
0.2338 
(0.0573)* 
0.0312 
(0.0094)* 
Capital Structure 0.00003 
(0.00003) 
0.00001 
(0.00004) 
0.00006 
(0.00006) 
Sectoral Variables    
MES -0.00002 
(0.0009) 
0.00006 
(0.0009) 
0.0009 
(0.0029) 
Import Penetration 0.00001 
(0.00002) 
0.000001 
(0.00003) 
0.000001 
(0.00003) 
Sectoral dummies  ? ? ? 
Cyclical variable    
GDP growth -0.0026 
(0.0014)*** 
-0.0026 
(0.0016) 
-0.0024 
(0.0025) 
Constant 0.0085 
(0.0413) 
0.0892 
(0.0482)*** 
-0.0815 
(0.0795) 
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ρ 0.7329 
(0.0342)* 
0.8050 
(0.0451)* 
0.6061 
(0.0621)* 
σ -2.2199 
(0.0114)* 
-2.3002 
(0.0152)* 
-2.1379 
(0.0177)* 
Loglikelihood  113.66 
(0.0000) 
69.97 
(0.0000) 
22.78 
(0.0000) 
Observations 9441 5882 3559 
Censored obs. 2256 1547 709 
Standard deviation in brackets. 
a The selection equation includes the variables Size (logarithmic number of workers), Age (logarithmic 
firm age), GXR (percentage of sales of exiters), GER (percentage of sales of entrants) and MES (medium 
efficient size). 
b See Annexe 1 for a description of the sectoral dummies. 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10%. 
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